Getting to Plan B: A History of Contraceptive Rights in the United States and an Argument for a Private Right of Action Against the FDA by Slachetka, Michele
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 19
Getting to Plan B: A History of Contraceptive
Rights in the United States and an Argument for a
Private Right of Action Against the FDA
Michele Slachetka
Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Michele Slachetka, Getting to Plan B: A History of Contraceptive Rights in the United States and an
Argument for a Private Right of Action Against the FDA, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 345 (2007),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol16/iss1/19
GETTING TO PLAN B: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTIVE
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND AN ARGUMENT FOR A
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THE FDA
Michele Slachetka'
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 345
I. THE HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES ............ 347
A. Contraceptive Rights, the Constitutional Right of Privacy, and the
Suprem e Court .......................................... 347
B. The Specific History of Emergency Contraceptives .............. 350
II. AN EYE INTO THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS ....................... 355
A. The FDA Approval Process Generally ........................ 355
B. The FDA's Reasons for Delaying a Decision on the Plan B
OTC Switch Application ................................... 358
C. The FDA's Decision to Allow Plan B Sales Behind-the-Counter .... 361
III. CHALLENGING THE FDA ...................................... 363
A. The Role of the Administrative Agency ........................ 363
B. The Standing Problem: The Gateway to Challenging the FDA ..... 364
C. A Constitutional Claim: The Fundamental Right of Privacy ....... 367
D. Administrative Law Requirements ............................ 369
E. Objections to Administrative and Constitutionally-Based Private
Rights of Action .......................................... 371
F. Looking Forward: The Tummino Case ........................ 373
1. Tummino's Unreasonable Delay Claim .................... 374
2. Tummino's Constitutional Claim ......................... 376
3. Tummino Summ ary .................................... 376
C ONCLUSION .................................................. 379
INTRODUCTION
[I]nstead of improving and advancing women's health, the FDA
leadership is ignoring its process and not relying on science and
medical evidence. Americans need a strong and independent FDA.'
* The author is a 2008 J.D. candidate at the William & Mary School of Law. She would
like to thank her parents, Dave and Linda, and her sister, Melissa, for their support. She would
also like to thank Alex May for his insightful comments and critique.
Press Release, Dr. Susan Wood, Former Ass't Comm'r for Women's Health & Former
Dir. of the Office of Women's Health, FDA, Comments on GAO Findings on Plan B (Nov.
14, 2005), available at http://www.go2ec.org/pdfs/SusanWoodonGAOReport.pdf.
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For years, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected the widespread
availability of Plan B, a drug designed to safely prevent unwanted pregnancies among
women of all ages.2 This drug has an eighty-nine percent effectiveness rate,3 but it is
one hundred percent controversial. Currently, women and men aged eighteen and
older can purchase Plan B without a prescription in pharmacies nationwide, but just
as cashiers card purchasers of alcohol or tobacco products, purchasers of Plan B must
present identification to prove their age to the pharmacists who dispense the drug.4
Many individuals, including former FDA insiders, consider this method of dispen-
sation unacceptable because it unnecessarily erects barriers to public health goals.5
This Note will examine the constitutional rights associated with the availability
and distribution of emergency contraceptives in the United States, particularly Plan B,
the "morning after pill," as a case study to show how the FDA approval process is
flawed and why consumers should be able to challenge this administrative process
in limited circumstances.
The first part of the Note will review Supreme Court decisions that interpret the
right of privacy and provide background on the history of contraceptives in the United
States.6 The second part of the Note will explore the FDA approval process, 7 emphasiz-
ing specific approval procedure discrepancies related to Plan B's proposed prescription-
to-over-the-counter switch.8 This section will suggest that the FDA chose not to
approve a safe and effective product and that non-scientific reasons unduly influenced
this choice.9 This section will also examine the FDA's August 2006 decision to
permit Plan B sales behind the counter.1
The third part of this Note will question whether the American public has a
constitutional right to challenge the validity of the FDA's drug approval process, or
whether the government, through the FDA's administrative powers, should always
decide unilaterally which products are placed in the stream of commerce.' This Note
will argue that the process is flawed and that individuals should have the right to
challenge it in order to maintain the integrity of the FDA. Finally, this section will
2 Duramed Pharm., Inc., What is Plan B?, http://www.go2planb.com/ForConsumers/
AboutPlanBIWhatisPlanB.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
3Id.
4 Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Over-the-Counter Access
for Plan B for Women 18 and Older: Prescription Remains Required for Those 17 and Under
(Aug. 24, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01436.html; NPR.org,
"Plan B" Pill to Be Sold Over the Counter, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyld=5703349 (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
' See Wood, supra note 1. Indeed, two FDA officials resigned because of the FDA's
handling of the Plan B application and its denial of OTC status to Plan B. Tummino v. Von
Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 227-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
6 See infra Part I.
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra Part II.B.
9 See id.
jo See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part Ill.
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describe the circumstances in which individuals should be able to challenge the FDA
approval process in court.'2
I. THE HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Contraceptive Rights, the Constitutional Right of Privacy, and the Supreme Court
A string of Supreme Court cases starting in the 1960s reveals a legal history of
contraceptive rights in the United States, 13 but contraceptive use started earlier.' 4 In his
work, Peter Irons states that the distribution of contraceptives was originally a spinoff
of the eugenics movement that was popular among nativists in the early twentieth
century. 5 The rise of Nazi Germany, with its stomach-turning sterilization of "unfit"
Germans gave supporters pause.' 6 The women's movement later distributed contra-
ceptives as part of feminist ideals. 7
The controversy over contraceptives became intimately tied with the constitutional
right of privacy in the landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut.8 An 1879 Connecticut
law titled "An Act to Amend an Act Concerning Offences Against Decency, Morality,
and Humanity" carried distinctly moral overtones and prohibited contraceptives.19
Despite the prohibition, or perhaps because of it, 0 Estelle Griswold, the Executive
Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton,
the Medical Director for the Planned Parenthood League in New Haven, provided con-
traceptives to a married couple and were arrested.2' They challenged their criminal
12 See id.
'" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Webster v.
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1 "Contraception" is the "[p]revention of conception or impregnation." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 404 (27th ed. 2000). Contraceptives are the actual methods, devices,
or drugs employed to prevent conception, including oral, intrauterine, and barrier contra-
ceptives. Id.
15 PETER IRONS, CASES AND CONTROVERSIES: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN CONTEXT
407 (2005).
16 id.
17 Id.
18 381 U.S. at 485-86.
19 JOHN W. JOHNSON, GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT: BIRTH CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY 8 (2005). Johnson mentions that the Connecticut law
mirrored, to a large extent, the Comstock Act, which was passed by Congress in 1873. The
Comstock Act, which was designed to prevent the circulation of obscene literature, strength-
ened federal law against the practice of sending obscene materials through the mail. Anthony
Comstock, a religious man, considered both literature and pictures about preventing con-
ception obscene materials. In his inspections as a postal agent, he seized over 60,000 condoms
and diaphragms and arrested fifty-five people for violating the law in 1873. Id. at 7-8.
20 Some argue that Griswold v. Connecticut was a legal test case specifically designed
to lift the prohibition against contraceptives. See id. at 6.
2" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
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conviction.22 Though the conviction was reversed, Justice Douglas did not base his
holding on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 23 instead, he used
the "penumbras" of the amendments in the Bill of Rights to suggest that there are
"zones of privacy" in which the government dare not interfere.24
Seven years after Griswold, the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts stat-
ute allowing the distribution of contraceptives to married couples to prevent pregnancy
but denying their distribution to single individuals because the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause.2 ' The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
calls for the equal treatment of similarly situated individuals. 26 Justice Brennan's ruling
expanded the fight of privacy under the Equal Protection Clause; without this ruling,
only married persons-but not unmarried persons-would have the fight to control
their reproductive health through the use of contraceptives.27 Unless unmarried and
married persons are "dislike" one another, the government is not allowed to treat
them differently. 28 In essence, Justice Brennan expanded the idea of privacy as a
fundamental constitutional right.2 9
22 id.
23 Id. at 481-82; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
24 Id. at 484-85. Justice Douglas relied on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
25 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447-48 (1972).
26 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432,439 (1985) (holding that animus is not a legitimate basis for unequal treatment
and that requiring special permits for a group home for the mentally retarded violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the differences between the mentally retarded and the occupants
of other facilities in the zoning area were irrelevant to the housing needs of each group).
27 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
28 Id. Clarifying his opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons
cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would
be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy
in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an asso-
ciation of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Id.
29 See JOHNSON, supra note 19, at 200.
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Roe v. Wade made waves in 1973 when the Supreme Court recognized a woman's
absolute right to an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy with a qualified
right thereafter.30 In Roe, the Supreme Court expanded the fundamental right of pri-
vacy and held that reproductive rights fall into this category of personal privacy rights.3'
Building on the fundamental right of privacy enunciated in Roe, Carey v. Population
Services International, decided four years later in 1977, challenged New York statutes
limiting the distribution of contraceptives.3 2 In Justice Brennan's opinion, the Supreme
Court made four distinct holdings. First, the Court held that a third party, namely,
the distributor of contraceptives, has a right to challenge a New York statute on behalf
of its customers.33 Second, the Court held that the decision whether to bear children
is so fundamental a choice that regulations affecting this right must be subject to strict
scrutiny. 34 Third, the Court held that individuals over sixteen would be unduly bur-
dened if they were allowed to receive non-medical contraceptives only from licensed
pharmacists. 35 Finally, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to outlaw the adver-
tisement or display of contraceptives.36 In addition to reaffirming the existence of a
fundamental right of privacy with respect to reproductive choices, the Court enunciated
its opinion that "[t]he business of manufacturing and selling contraceptives may be
regulated in ways that do not infringe protected individual choices. And even a bur-
densome regulation may be validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest.
37
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey is one of the more
recent Supreme Court decisions discussing reproductive rights.38 In Casey, a physician
and a Planned Parenthood organization challenged the constitutionality of amendments
to a Pennsylvania abortion statute that imposed consent, notice, and time restrictions
on abortions.39 Using the principle of stare decisis,4 ° Casey reaffirmed Roe's holding
that a woman has a right to choose whether to have an abortion before viability of the
fetus, but it discarded Roe's trimester test.4 Casey also relied heavily on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and emphasized a personal right of
30 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
"' Id. at 152-53. In the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun stated, "[w]e, therefore, con-
clude that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id. at 154.
32 See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 683 (1977); JOHNSON, supra note
19, at 201.
13 Carey, 431 U.S. at 683.
34 Id. at 686.
31 Id. at 689.
36 Id. at 700-01.
17 Id. at 685-86.
38 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39 Id.
40 Id. at 854.
I4 d. at 872.
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privacy.42 The Court stated that "[n]either the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices
of States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer
limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects."43
In the fifteen years since Casey, women have relied on the existence of this right of
privacy and personal liberty when making decisions regarding their reproductive health.
B. The Specific History of Emergency Contraceptives
The phrase "emergency contraception" refers to drugs consisting of estrogen and
progestin, either singly or in combination, which are used to prevent pregnancy after
some form of unprotected intercourse including rape, failure of ordinary contracep-
tives, or lack of planning.44 Emergency contraception is colloquially referred to as the
"morning after pill. '45 A woman's ability to access emergency contraception has been
questioned by state legislatures and challenged in the courts. In recent years, citizen
petition groups and drug manufacturers have fought back. The history of emergency
contraception use in the United States is instructive in understanding today's debates.
The FDA approved the use of ordinary oral contraceptives in the 1960s.46 Since
that time, physicians, emergency room hospitals, reproductive health clinics, and uni-
versity health centers prescribed combinations of oral contraceptive pills or dosages as
a form of emergency contraception. 7 The FDA, however, never officially sanctioned
the emergency use of oral contraceptives at that time.4 8 The Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy filed a citizen petition in 1994 with the FDA requesting that the FDA
label certain oral contraceptives for use as emergency contraception. 49 The FDA denied
this petition but left to its Advisory Committee the issue of deciding the safety and
efficacy of oral contraceptives.50 In 1997, the FDA stated that emergency contra-
ception "substantially reduces the chances of becoming pregnant after unprotected
sexual intercourse."'" Furthermore, the FDA acknowledged that the risks associated
with emergency contraception were similar to the risks associated with ordinary oral
42 Id. at 846-47.
41 Id. at 848.
4 Prescription Drug Products; Certain Combined Oral Contraceptives for Use as Postcoital
Emergency Contraception, 62 Fed. Reg. 8610 (proposed Feb. 25, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 314) [hereinafter Prescription Drug Products].
45 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Emergency Contraception, WOMEN'S HEALTH
(2006), http://www.4woman.gov/faq/econtracep.htm [hereinafter Emergency Contraception].
46 FDA, FDA CallsforApplicationsfor Emergency Use of Oral Contraceptives, 27 FDA
MEDICAL BULLETIN (March 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/medbull/mar97/notices
.htm [hereinafter Applications for Emergency Use].
41 See Prescription Drug Products, supra note 44, at 8610.
48 See Applications for Emergency Use, supra note 48.
49 See Prescription Drug Products, supra note 44, at 8610.
50 Id.
"' See Applications for Emergency Use, supra note 48.
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52contraceptives. The FDA's statement affirmed the results of a 1970s study that
showed that high doses of the conventional birth control pill could prevent pregnancy
when taken within seventy-two hours of sexual intercourse.53 The statement also rein-
forced the findings of an FDA-hosted panel of experts who unanimously concluded
such high doses were "both safe and effective. 54 As a result, the FDA solicited drug
manufacturers for supplemental new drug applications (sNDAs) for the use of oral
contraceptives as a form of emergency contraception starting in 1997.55
The FDA approved the first oral contraceptive for emergency use within one
year of soliciting sNDAs.56 In September 1998, the FDA officially approved Preven,
which contained both estrogen and progestin,57 for prescription use as an emergency
contraceptive pill.58 In July 1999 the FDA also approved Plan B, a progestin-only
drug, as an emergency contraceptive pill for prescription use only.59 Individuals who
believed that Plan B and any other form of morning after pill were abortifacients
objected to the decision.6°
The controversy over pharmacists' rights emerged as a backlash from this
approval.61 Some pharmacists chose not to fill Preven or Plan B prescriptions or even
to stock emergency contraception in their pharmacies.62 For example, in April 1999,
prior to the approval of Plan B for prescription use, Wal-Mart announced that it would
not stock emergency contraception in any of its pharmacies based on a "variety of
52 Id.
" Sheldon Segal, Contraceptive Update, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457,463-64
(1997).
54 Id. at 464.
55 See Applications for Emergency Use, supra note 48.
56 CenterWatch, Drugs Approved by the FDA, http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/drugs/
dru476.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006).
51 Monica J. Smith, New Contraception Options, DIABETES SELF-MGMT., Sept.-Oct.
2004, available at http://www.diabetesselfmanagement.com/arficle.cfm?sid=2&tid=96&stid
=142&aid= 1908.
58 CenterWatch, supra note 58; FDA, Talk Paper T98-49, FDA ApprovesApplicationfor
Preven Emergency Contraceptive Kit (Sept. 2, 1998), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/
ANSWERS/ANS00892.html [hereinafter Preven].
" See Duramed Pharm., Inc., About Plan B, http://www.go2planb.comForPharmacists/
aboutPlanB/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 15,2006) [hereinafter About Plan B]; Ann Friedman,
Over-the-Counter Insurgency, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.mother
jones.com/news/update/2006/08/planbjtimeline.html; Prescription Drug Products, supra note
44, at 8610; Smith, supra note 59.
60 See, e.g., Suzanne Alexander, Plan B: Russian Roulette, Anyone?, CHRISTIAN MED.
& DENTALASS'NS, Oct. 5, 2005, http://www.cmdahome.org/index.cgi?CONTEXT=rt&cat=
10011 l&art=3105&BISKIT=385721741 1&CONTEXT=art (last visited July 13, 2007).
61 See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Pharmacists with No Plan B, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug.
2006, available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/august/31.44.html; Rob Stein,
Pharmacists' Rights at the Front of New Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2005, at Al.
62 Stein, supra note 63, at Al.
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business considerations. 63 Wal-Mart announced that it would refer women requesting
EC to an alternate pharmacy instead. 64 In March 2006, however, Wal-Mart reversed
its position, stating that it would stock Plan B.65 The reversal occurred after three
women in Massachusetts filed a lawsuit against the company.66 In Illinois, a state direc-
tive achieved the same result. 67 Wal-Mart then decided to sell emergency contraception
in its pharmacies nationwide.68
On the opposite end of the spectrum, other organizations and groups pushed for
over-the-counter (OTC) use of Plan B by releasing statements and petitioning the
FDA directly. In 2000, the American Medical Association (AMA) stated that it would
support an sNDA asking the FDA to switch Plan B from prescription-only use to OTC
use. 69 A trustee for the AMA confirmed that it would support wider access to emer-
gency contraception if the FDA found that OTC distribution was safe.7 ° However, the
trustee also cautioned that the AMA would continue to respect the right of physicians
to abstain from conduct that conflicted with their moral principles.7' In February
2001, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) encouraged
the approval of emergency contraception for OTC status.72 ACOG cited the FDA's
findings that emergency contraception was safe and effective in preventing pregnancy
in support of its position, and it also stated that increased availability of emergency
contraception could substantially reduce the abortion rate in America.73
Groups also petitioned the FDA directly. A consortium of over seventy repro-
ductive and medical health organizations formally filed a citizen petition in February
2001 asking the FDA to switch Preven 74 and Plan B from prescription-only to OTC
status.75 The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (now known as the Center for
63 See Friedman, supra note 61.
64 B.A. Robinson, Wal-Mart's Initial Refusal to Stock EC-the "Morning-After" Pill,
RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE, http://www.religioustolerance.org/abo_walm.htm (last visited Nov.
8, 2007).
65 Press Release, Nat'l Org. for Women, Decision by Wal-Mart to Stock Emergency
Contraception "Long Overdue" (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.now.org/press/
03-06/03-03.html. This change in policy was unexpected, so it is not surprising to learn that
Wal-Mart did not change its position willingly. Id.
66 id.
67 Robinson, supra note 66.
68 Id.
69 Jane Cys, AMA Eyes Over-the-Counter Access for Emergency Contraception,
AMNEWS, Dec. 25, 2000, http://www.go2ec.org/pdfs/EndorsementAMAOTC.pdf.
70 id.
71 id.
72 Friedman, supra note 61.
73 Press Release, ACOG, Statement of the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists Supporting the Availability of Over-the-Counter Emergency Contraception
(Feb. 14, 2001), available at http://www.go2ec.org/pdfs/EndorsementACOG-OTC.pdf.
74 Preven was on the market until 2004. See Friedman, supra note 61.
" Ctr. for Reprod. Law & Policy, Citizen's Petition (Feb. 14, 2001), available at
[Vol. 16:345352
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Reproductive Rights) served as common counsel for the petitioners.76 Five years later,
the FDA denied the citizen petition on June 9, 2006, stating that the petitioners did not
have standing to file a request and that their petition lacked supporting scientific data.77
In April 2003 the manufacturer of Plan B, Women's Capital Corporation, submit-
ted an application to the FDA to switch Plan B from prescription to OTC status for
women of all ages.7' The application contained information from thirty-nine clinical
studies and included over 15,000 pages of data.79 On February 13, 2004, the FDA
extended the decision deadline until May 21, 2004.80 Barr Pharmaceuticals acquired
Women's Capital Corporation approximately two weeks later, on February 26, 2004.1
In March 2004 Barr amended the original application and proposed that Plan B be
made available over the counter for women sixteen and older and by prescription for
those under sixteen. 2 On May 5, 2004, the Acting Director of the FDA's Center for
Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) denied the application because Barr did not
adequately address the effects of Plan B on young adolescents. 3 Dr. Galson stated that
the CDER also did not review the amendment because Barr did not sufficiently explain
how Plan B would be labeled for both prescription and OTC use. s4 In response, Barr
Pharmaceuticals submitted a new application that addressed the labeling issues.8 5 On
August 26, 2005, the FDA announced that it would not rule on Barr Pharmaceutical's
new proposal by the September 1, 2005, deadline but would instead allow sixty days
for public comment.86 On July 31, 2006, the FDA proposed selling Plan B over the
counter to women aged eighteen and older.87 Abruptly, the FDA formally approved
the sale of Plan B behind the counter to women and men aged eighteen and older on
http://www.crlp.org/pdf/EC-petition.pdf.
76 Id. at 5.
77 Letter from Randall W. Lutter, Assoc. Comm'r for Policy & Planning, Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., to Bonnie Scott Jones, Esq., & Simon Heller, Esq., Ctr. for Reprod. Rts
(June 9, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/01 p0075/01 p-0075-
pdnOOl-vo1348.pdf; see Friedman, supra note 61.
78 See Friedman, supra note 61.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Press Release, Barr Pharm., Inc., Barr Completes Acquisition of Women's Capital
Corporation and Plan B Emergency Contraception (Feb. 26, 2004), available at http://www
prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT= 104&STORY=/www/story/02-26-2004/
002117446&EDATE.
82 Letter from Steven Galson, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Joseph
A. Carrado, Senior Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Barr Research, Inc. (May 6, 2004), available
athttp://www.fda.gov/cder/druglinfopage/planB/planBNALetter.pdf(reciting a brief history
of Barr's application and amendments).
83 Id.
84 id.
85 See Friedman, supra note 61.
86 Id.
87 Id.
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August 24,2006."8 The FDA did not specify when behind-the-counter sales of Plan B
would begin,89 but some pharmacies and student health centers began selling Plan B
behind-the-counter in November 2006.90
In addition to petitions, lawsuits were filed against the FDA. Before the FDA
issued any decision on Plan B, the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a lawsuit
against Lester Crawford, the then-Acting Commissioner of the FDA, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.9' The complaint claimed
that the FDA's refusal to issue a decision constituted a constructive denial of the appli-
cation,92 which effectively violated a woman's right of privacy and equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment.93 Individual women and members of the Morning-After-
Pill Conspiracy (on behalf of all women who need emergency contraception), the
Association for Reproductive Health Professionals (ARHP), and the National Latina
Institute for Reproductive Health filed the lawsuit. 94
Finally, the states responded differently to the idea of prescription and OTC emer-
gency contraception. Between 1997 and 2005, well before the 2006 FDA approval
of Plan B for behind-the-counter sales, legislation in eight states allowed pharmacists
to dispense emergency contraception without a prescription.95 Conversely, Republican
John Stahl introduced a bill to the Michigan legislature in 2005 proposing to ban all
nonprescription sales of emergency contraception. 96 Later that year, the Missouri
88 Marc Kaufman & Rob Stein, Plan B Approval Said to Be Near, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,
2006, at Al; Rob Stein, FDA Approves Plan B's Over-the-Counter Sale, WASH. POST, Aug.
25, 2006, at A4.
89 See Stein, supra note 90, at A4.
9 E.g., College of William & Mary, Student Health Center, http://www.wm.edu/health/
(last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
91 Complaint at 10, Tummino v. Crawford, No. 1:05cv00366 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2005).
92 Id.
9' Id. at 15.
9 Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rights, State of Wisconsin Seeks to Join Center's Lawsuit
Against the FDA Over the "Morning-After Pill" (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www
.crlp.org/pr_06_0315WisconsinFDA.html. The State of Wisconsin also sought to intervene
in that suit as a plaintiff. Press Release, State of Wis. Dep't of Justice, Lawsuit Against FDA
over Delay in "Plan B" Emergency Contraception (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www
.doj.state.wi.us/news/2006/nrO31506_PL.asp.
9' See Friedman, supra note 61. The eight states that allowed a physician to dispense
emergency contraception without a prescription before the FDA approval were, in reverse
chronological order, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Hawaii, New Mexico, Alaska,
California, and Washington, which had legislation on this point pre-dating 1997. Id.
96 Michigan Lawmaker Introduces Bill that Would Ban Nonprescription Sales of EC in
State, MED. NEWS TODAY, Nov. 30, 2005, available at http://www.medicalnewstoday.con/
medicalnews.php?newsid=34305. Representative Stahl introduced the following bill in the
Michigan House of Representatives on October 18, 2005:
(1) Emergency contraception shall only be dispensed as a prescription
drug and under the control of a licensed pharmacist or prescriber. The
[Vol. 16:345354
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Senate also introduced a bill proposing that emergency contraception be limited to
prescription-use only.97 As of July 2007, multiple states have legislation restricting
access to emergency contraception.98 These restrictions take various forms, from the
exclusion of emergency contraception from Medicaid Family Planning Expansion and
the Contraceptive Coverage Mandate to state laws that allow either the pharmacist or
the pharmacy to refuse to dispense emergency contraception."
II. AN EYE INTO THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS
A. The FDA Approval Process Generally
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) outlines the powers given to
the FDA by Congress to regulate food and drug use in the United States. 100 Section 355
of the FDCA describes the procedure for regulating new drugs. °' The FDCA prohibits
new drugs from entering the stream of interstate commerce unless an application for
the new drug has been filed with and approved by the FDA.' 1
The FDCA emphasizes safety and efficacy. A petitioner who submits a new drug
application (NDA) must also submit investigation reports to prove that the drug is
licensed pharmacist or prescriber who dispenses the emergency contra-
ception shall maintain the same records for the dispensing of the emer-
gency contraception as required for the dispensing of prescription drugs.
(2) As used in this section, "emergency contraception" means a medi-
cation or combination of medications approved by the federal Food and
Drug Administration taken or used after sexual intercourse for the pre-
vention of pregnancy by preventing ovulation, fertilization of an egg,
or implantation of an egg in a uterus.
H.R. 5311, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005).
9' On December 1, 2005, Senators Crowell, Engler, Mayer, and Nodler introduced the
following bill:
1. For purposes of this section, "emergency contraceptive" means any
drug approved by the Food and Drug Administration that prevents preg-
nancy after intercourse and which contains the hormones estrogen and
progestin, either separately or in combination.
2. Emergency contraceptives shall be dispensed only upon prescription
by an authorized health care professional.
S.B. 608, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006).
98 Emergency Contraception, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF (Guttmacher Inst., New York,
N.Y.), Aug. 1, 2007, available at http://www.guttmacher.orglstatecenter/spibs/spib-EC.pdf.
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Dakota had explicit restrictions
concerning EC. Id.
99 Id.
'00 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000).
101 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 (West Supp. 2007).
102 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
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"safe for use and... effective in use."' 3 The Act also dictates that all of the individuals
who review the applications should have "technical excellence, lack of bias and conflict
of interest, and knowledge of regulatory and scientific standards."'"
The timeline for review is quite short; the FDCA states that within 180 days of the
petitioner's filing of an NDA, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) must
either approve the application or give the petitioner notice of an opportunity for a
hearing to discuss the scientific issues involved and determine whether the application
is approvable.'05 This deadline can be extended only if the HHS Secretary and the
petitioner agree to an extension.' °6
Finally, the FDCA enumerates the acceptable grounds for refusing a new drug
application. The HHS Secretary can reject a new drug application if (1) the investi-
gations submitted by the petitioner do not include tests that are adequate to determine
the safety of the drug;'07 (2) the tests show that the drug is not safe; 0 8 (3) the manufac-
turing, processing, and packing processes for the drug are not adequate; °9 (4) other
information in the application or other information about the drug is insufficient to
show the drug's safety;"0 (5) there is a lack of substantial evidence to show the effec-
tiveness of the drug from the application and other information available about the
drug;"'. (6) patent information for the drug was not provided with the application;" 2
or, finally, if (7) the labeling was false or misleading."1 3
The FDA is divided into specialized departments and divisions, each armed with
procedures to carry out the approval process in accordance with the FDCA's guide-
lines. The process for approval of an OTC switch application is similar to the new
drug application and approval process. Instead of an NDA, the petitioner submits an
sNDA for an approved NDA."14 Typically, the drug manufacturer or sponsor submits
the data, and the CDER reviews the data.' '5 Two of the CDER's six drug evaluation
103 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2004).
'04 Id. § 355(b)(5)(A).
'0' 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (2000).
106 Id.
107 Id. § 355(d)(1).
108 Id. § 355(d)(2).
I09 Id. § 355(d)(3).
0 Id. § 355(d)(4).
111 Id. § 355(d)(5).
112 Id. § 355(d)(6).
113 Id. § 355(d)(7).
114 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABIuTY OFFICE, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, DECISION
PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETING OF THE
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIvE DRUG PLAN B WAS UNUSUAL 8 (Nov. 2005), available at
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-109 [hereinafter GAO] (reviewing the FDA's approval
process and the peculiar chain of events surrounding the OTC application for Plan B).
115 FDA, OTC Drug Monograph Review Process, CDERHANDBOOK, http://www.fda.govl
cder/handbook/otc.htm [hereinafter OTCDrug Monograph Review Process] (diagraming the
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offices review the data for drugs that are the first within a particular class of drugs to
be reviewed by the FDA for an OTC switch.' 6 The Office of Drug Evaluation V
reviews all OTC switch applications; it is automatically one of the two reviewing
offices." 7 The second office reviewing the data is the one with expertise relevant to
the drug."' A joint advisory committee of outside experts also may provide scientific
advice, if requested." 9 Together, the two offices of the CDER review the OTC switch
application and the advice from the joint advisory committee. 2 ' If the offices agree,
they sign and issue an action letter that the FDA sends to the sponsor. 12' Three out-
comes are possible. First, an application can receive "approval," in which case the drug
gains OTC status. 22 If it does not, the application is marked as either "approvable"
or "not-approvable."' 23 In the latter two cases, the issue letter states the application's
deficiencies, and the petitioner may address them and file again. 24
If the two offices of the CDER cannot reach a consensus, the OTC switch appli-
cation is forwarded to a superior office for further review.'25 The Director of the Office
of New Drugs within the CDER or the CDER Director makes the decision and signs
the action letter. 126 Opportunity for the applicant to revise and amend the application
is built into this procedure. 127 Sometimes a sixty to ninety day comment period allow-
ing the public to voice its opinion on the proposal may occur after the proposal is
published in the Federal Register. 2
8
The Offices of Drug Evaluation V 129 and rI'3° reviewed the Plan B OTC appli-
cation submitted in April 2003."'1 The sNDA contained both an actual use study for
Plan B and a label comprehension study to evaluate whether consumers would under-
stand how to use the product.'32 The two offices relied on the advice of ajoint advisory
internal process for OTC drug application and review).
116 See GAO, supra note 116, at 1.
117 Id.
118 id.
" Id. at 1-2.
120 Id. at 2.
121 Id.; OTC Drug Monograph Review Process, supra note 117.
122 See GAO, supra note 116, at 9.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See OTC Drug Monograph Review Process, supra note 117.
128 Id.
129 The Division of Over-the-Counter Products is part of the Office of Drug Evaluation V.
See GAO, supra note 116, at 2.
130 The Division of Reproductive and Urologic Projects is part of the Office of Drug
Evaluation III. Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 14.
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committee comprised of the Nonprescription Drugs Advisory Committee and the
Advisory Committee for Reproductive Health Drugs during the review process.
133
The advisory committee overwhelmingly recommended the approval of the Plan B
OTC switch application.134 FDA review personnel agreed that Plan B should be
approved.' 35 Nonetheless, the Acting Director of the CDER instead issued a not-
approvable letter on the initial Plan B OTC switch application in May 2004.36
B. The FDA 's Reasons for Delaying a Decision on the Plan B OTC
Switch Application
In November 2005, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report on the FDA's decisionmaking process for the initial Plan B OTC switch
application and concluded that the procedure was "unusual."'137 The GAO discovered
that the FDA did not follow its prescription-to-OTC switch application review proce-
dures in four ways. First, the individuals who are usually responsible for issuing the
action letter, the directors of the Offices of Drug Evaluation 1I and V, did not sign the
not-approvable action letter for the Plan B application. 38 They told the GAO that they
approved the Plan B prescription-to-OTC switch. 39 The Director of the Office of New
Drugs was next in line to sign and issue the action letter. 0 Like the directors of the
evaluating offices, he did not agree with the Acting Director of the CDER' s decision
to issue a not-approvable letter and did not sign it.14' The Acting Director of the CDER
signed and issued the not-approvable letter instead.142 The FDA maintains that the
reason the directors for the Offices of Drug Evaluation and the Office of New Drugs
did not sign the not-approvable letter is because the Acting Director of the CDER did
not actually ask any of them for their signature. 143 This explanation is both circuitous
and unsatisfying-the Acting Director of the CDER did not ask these directors to sign
the not-approvable letter because he knew that they did not agree with the decision
and would refuse to sign.44
'3 Id. at 2.
13 Id. The vote by the joint advisory committees was twenty-three in favor of approval
and four against approval of the application. Id.
135 id.
136 Id. at 5.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 5.
139 Id. at 19.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 5.
142 Id.
141 Id. at 20.
144 Id.
[Vol. 16:345
GETrING TO PLAN B
That the Director of the Office of New Drugs was asked to review the staff s
decision at all is unusual in itself. '45 Under the FDA's standard operating procedures,
the Director of the Office of New Drugs makes a decision on the prescription-to-
OTC switch application only if there is a disagreement between the two reviewing
offices-in the case of Plan B, there was no such disagreement because both reviewing
offices approved the OTC switch.'46
Second, high-level FDA management participated in the review and decision-
making process for the Plan B application to an unusual degree. 147 Staff at the Offices
of Drug Evaluation III and V stated that at a January 2004 meeting the Acting Director
of the CDER told them that high-level management would act on the Plan B switch
application. 48 The Director for the Office of New Drugs informed the GAO that
this was not the usual procedure for approval decisionmaking, but other FDA officials
stated that high-level management involvement is always possible in any visible, sensi-
tive, and controversial case.' 49 These officials declared that such involvement occurred
in the past.150
Third, the GAO found evidence that the decision to issue a not-approvable action
letter may have been made before the reviews even were completed. 5 ' The Offices
of Drug Evaluation II and V completed their reviews of the Plan B OTC switch appli-
cation in April 2004.152 Personnel from both those offices, however, stated that high-
level management told them that the Plan B application would receive a not-approvable
letter.153 High-level management made the decision on Plan B before the Offices of
Drug Evaluation completed their evaluations. The Director and Deputy Director of
the Office of New Drugs confirmed that the Acting Director of the CDER told them
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 20-21.
50 Id. The FDA gave two examples of previous high-level involvement in review decisions.
Both examples involved NDAs, not OTC switch applications. First, the Director of the CDER
approved thalidomide, a drug for leprosy, despite the review staff's concerns about off-label
usage. Id. at 21 n.41. The Deputy Center Director of the CDER signed the approval letter.
Letter from Murray M. Lumpkin, Deputy Ctr. Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to
Steve Thomas, Celgene Corp. (July 16, 1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/
appletter/1998/207851tr.pdf. Second, the Commissioner signed the approval letter for mifep-
ristone. GAO, supra note 116, at 21 n.42. The Commissioner and the review staff both agreed
that mifepristone should be approved, but the Commissioner signed the letter to protect the
identities of the review staff. Id. A copy of the approval letter can be found on the FDA's web-
site. Letter from the Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research to Sandra P. Arnold, Vice President
of Corporate Affairs, Population Council (Sept. 28, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/foi/appletter/2000/20687appltr.pdf [hereinafter RU-486 Approval Letter].
151 See GAO, supra note 116, at 5.
1' Id. at 21.
153 Id.
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that the Plan B application would receive a not-approvable letter in December 2003,
five months before he announced the decision. 154 High-level management denied
making such statements; the Acting Director of the CDER stated that he may have
merely indicated after the December 2003 meeting that the agency was leaning toward
a not-approvable decision. 5 Although review staff claim that they were told during
a January 14, 2004, meeting that Plan B would receive a not-approvable decision, the
minutes from the meeting show that the Acting Director only recommended a not-
approvable decision.'56 Furthermore, the Acting Director of the CDER claimed he
did not make his final decision until a few weeks before the action letter was issued
in May 2004.117
Finally, the GAO concluded that the Acting Director of the CDER's rationale for
issuing the not-approvable action letter was abnormal.5 8 The GAO learned that the
Acting Director of the CDER was concerned that younger adolescents would be more
likely to engage in unsafe sex if Plan B were available over the counter, and this con-
cem partially motivated his decision. 59 The Acting Director of the CDER found the
petitioner's actual use and label comprehension studies to be inadequate because the
studies did not evaluate enough adolescents under the age of sixteen to gauge the
effect that OTC Plan B would have on their behavior.'6° The Acting Director of the
CDER refused to extrapolate the data from adolescents over sixteen to younger ado-
lescents.' 6' He claimed that the differences in cognitive maturity between younger
and older adolescents argued against extrapolating the results. 62 However, the CDER
did not consider differences in cognitive maturity among adolescents or the influence
these differences have on behavior in any OTC-switch application prior to the Plan B
switch application. 163
The departures from standard operating procedures and from the advice of the
professional evaluation staff suggest that the Acting Director of the CDER made his
decision on Plan B for non-scientific reasons. Though the FDA considered both
scientific and non-scientific evidence when deciding whether to approve Plan B for
OTC status, it ultimately deferred to non-scientific reasoning when issuing its decision.
154 id.
115 Id. at 21-22.
156 Id. at 21.
' Id. at 21-22.
158 Id. at 5.
159 Id.
'60 Id. at 5, 24.
161 Id.
161 Id. at 22. The Acting Director of the CDER believed that because cognitive maturity is
less developed in younger adolescents, they would be less able to control impulsive behavior,
including impulses to engage in risky sexual conduct, if Plan B were available over the counter.
Id. at 23.
163 Id. at 22.
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C. The FDA's Decision to Allow Plan B Sales Behind-the-Counter
After the FDA denied the initial Plan B prescription-to-OTC switch application,
Barr Pharmaceuticals submitted an amended sNDA that addressed both the Acting
Director of the CDER's and the FDA's labeling recommendations.64 The amended
sNDA recommended the sale of Plan B over the counter for women aged sixteen and
older. 65 After meeting with the FDA, Barr Pharmaceuticals agreed to resubmit the
Plan B application using eighteen-and-older guidelines. ' 6 On August 24, 2006, less
than two weeks after Barr Pharmaceuticals agreed to resubmit the application, the FDA
approved sales of Plan B to women and men aged eighteen and above without a
prescription.' 67 The FDA approved Plan B for behind-the-counter sales instead of OTC
sales, 68 however, and currently women under eighteen still must have a prescription
to purchase the drug.' 69
The FDA's approval is not satisfactorily explained by scientific advances, because
no reported changes or new discoveries in the safety or efficacy of Plan B prefaced the
FDA's reversal. 70 Indeed, the data had not changed. The FDA review staff had
already concluded that Plan B was safe and effective for women and young girls. 17 1
Other relevant studies to date showed that access to emergency contraceptives did not
increase risky sexual behavior among adolescents. 72 In fact, the FDA chose eighteen
as the cut-off age for Plan B because this age is used as the cut-off age for sales of
nicotine and cold medicine products. 1
73
"6 Aaron Lorenzo, Plan B Progress Seen as Aid to Von Eschenbach, BIoWoRLD TODAY,
Aug. 14, 2006, available at http://www.bioworld.com/servlet/com.accumedia.web.Dispatcher
?next=bioWorldHeadlinesarticle&forceid=4042 1.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Gardiner Harris, FDA Approves Broader Access to Next-DayPill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25,
2006, at Al.
168 In July 2006, the FDA told Barr Pharmaceuticals that it might consider approval of
Plan B over the counter if the age limit were increased. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Morning-After
Pill Could Be over Counter, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 1, 2006, at Al. After years of delay, the
FDA approved Plan B with dual status and the new age limit less than one month later. John
Davidson, Morning-After Pill Gets OTCApproval, TIMEs LEADER (Willes-Barre, Pa.), Aug. 25,
2006, at Al.
169 Davidson, supra note 171, at Al.
170 Articles reporting the FDA's decision did not cite any new scientific data as the reason
why OTC availability of Plan B was more acceptable in August 2006 than in May 2004 when
the FDA issued the not-approvable letter. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 90, at A4.
'' Judith Graham, Plan B Pill Gets OK for Direct Sale, DAILY PRESS (Newport News,
Va.), Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
172 Id.
173 Finally, on to Plan B: Controversial "Morning-After" Pill Helps Prevent Unwanted
Pregnancies, LAS VEGAS SUN, Aug. 28, 2006, at A4 [hereinafter Finally, on to Plan B].
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The FDA may have changed its position because it was satisfied that Plan B was
safe and effective for OTC use for women eighteen and older, but there are skeptics.1
4
Some allege that the FDA bowed to political pressure from the White House when
originally deciding to issue the not-approvable action letter on the initial and subse-
quent Plan B prescription-to-OTC switch applications. 175 Others state that the FDA's
reversal in the summer of 2006 was also politically motivated. Senators Hillary
Rodham Clinton and Patty Murray from New York and Washington, respectively,
threatened to stall President Bush's nomination of Andrew von Eschenbach for the
position of FDA Commissioner. 76 The Senators dropped the hold when the FDA
issued its approvable decision on Barr Pharmaceutical's most recent sNDA for a
Plan B OTC switch for women aged eighteen and older.
177
Political factors similar to those that influenced the FDA approval process for
RU-486 also directed the approval process for the Plan B prescription-to-OTC switch
application. The two drugs are different: Plan B works by preventing an unplanned
pregnancy, while RU-486 contains mifepristone, which induces abortions by inter-
rupting and terminating an established pregnancy.178 RU-486's success rate exceeds
ninety-five percent when it is used with a second drug that induces contractions. 7 One
writer stated that "[plolitical opposition to RU 486 in the United States has prevented
its availability as a medical abortifacient in this country."' 18 Another author suggested
that the FDA would not approve clinical trials for RU-486 because the first Bush
administration objected to abortion.' Consequently, pharmaceutical companies
declined to begin the approval process. 182 Similarly, yet another author stated that the
major concern with RU-486 was the drug's potential to erode the power of pro-life
groups to control access to abortions. 8 3 The FDA ultimately approved RU-486 for
prescription-use in 2000.14
174 See, e.g., Editorial, FDA Chokes on "Plan B"Pill: Morning-After Pill Becomes Political
Football, PHILA. DAILY NEwS, Aug. 3, 2006, at 15; Stephanie Saul, F.D.A. Shifts View on Next-
Day Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2006, at Al.
171 See Finally, on to Plan B, supra note 176, at A4.
176 See Graham, supra note 174, at Al; see also Lorenzo, supra note 167.
177 Conservative Group Hunts Senators to Thwart Vote for FDA Head, FDA WEEKLY,
Sept. 1, 2006 (on file with the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal).
178 See Segal, supra note 55, at 464; see also 60 Minutes: The Debate over Plan B (CBS
television broadcast June 11,2006) (transcript available athttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/11/22/60minutes/main 1068924.shtml).
171 See Segal, supra note 55, at 464.
180 Id.
'8' Mark A. Hernandez, RU-486; Safe?Effective?Banned! Why Would the Food andDrug
Administration Ban a Drug with Such Potential?, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 653, 668 (1993).
182 id.
183 Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils the
FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FORESTL. REv. 571, 573 (2001).
' See RU-486 Approval Letter, supra note 152.
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Prior to 2000, the FDA did not approve RU-486 for use as an abortifacient, but
it did allow the drug to be used as treatment for another medical condition. One author
noted that the FDA denied "a twenty-nine year-old woman a ninety-six percent proven
effective means of nonsurgical abortion while allowing a middle age man access to
the drug [RU-486] for a use that is essentially speculative [battling brain tumors]."' 85
This example illustrates that the FDA approval process can become inconsistent when
it is subject to external pressure that restricts its ability to approve safe and effective
products. So what can the American public do? The next part of this Note will explain
in more detail the proposition that individuals should be able to challenge the FDA
approval process, and it will suggest the types of limited situations in which they can
exercise this right.
Ill. CHALLENGING THE FDA
A. The Role of the Administrative Agency
Moral judgment is a legitimate reason for the government to ban products or
outlaw certain behavior.'86 Moral judgments are a method of constitutional decision-
making, and many of our past and present federal and state laws are based on moral
and religious values.'87 However, moral judgment should not play any role in the
FDA's decisionmaking process.
The role of the FDA is not to legislate, but to evaluate and approve products that
meet the standards of safety and efficacy.'88 Recently, the FDA disregarded moral
issues in the face of controversial concerns over enhancement biotechnologies. For
example, in 2002 Eli Lilly submitted an NDA for Humatrope, a human growth hor-
mone (HGH) drug that could be used on abnormally short children. 189 These children
were not deficient in HGH, but the FDA only considered whether the drug was safe
and effective for non-growth hormone deficiency.' 90 Even though there were ethical
concerns with enhancement biotechnologies, excerpts from the clinical review and
advisory committee deliberations showed that "it [was] not possible for the Agency
to incorporate [moral] thinking into its final decision-making [sic] process, for there
185 Claire L. Ahren, Note, Drug Approval in the United States and England: A Question
of Medical Safety or Moral Persuasion ?-The RU-486 Example, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REv. 93, 109 (1994).
186 Marriage laws, obscenity laws, and abortion laws are examples of the numerous types
of moral legislation in the United Sates. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-70 (2000);
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. IV 2004).
187 See sources cited note 186.
188 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
189 See Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in
FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1135, 1180-81 (2005).
'90 Id. at 1180.
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is no system or precedent which would allow it."' 9' In contrast, the FDA discounted
scientific evidence of safety and efficacy in consideration of ethical or moral concerns
with Plan B, thus abrogating its delegated authority.'92
American citizens should be able to challenge the FDA when non-scientific
influences dominate the approval process. First, because high-level FDA officials are
appointed and insulated from the political process, they should be held legally account-
able for exceeding the scope of their authority. Second, affected citizens should have
the opportunity to challenge the validity of suspect decisions, such as the Plan B
decision. The goal of allowing challenges is to prevent history from repeating itself
with other scientifically proven but ethically controversial drugs that have yet to come
before the FDA.
B. The Standing Problem: The Gateway to Challenging the FDA
The law provides private individuals with little recourse to the courts if the FDA
disapproves or withholds approval of a drug. The FDCA allows an applicant to appeal
the FDA's order on a new drug application to the United States Court of Appeals for
the district of the applicant's residence or principal place of business within sixty
days.' 93 The HHS Secretary must provide the court with the administrative record
of the decision.'" The court then has exclusive jurisdiction to affirm or set aside the
order. 95 The FDCA implies that applicants must exhaust internal administrative
remedies before appealing to the court.'96 The FDCA also places the burden of per-
suasion on the plaintiff-applicant; the text states that the HHS Secretary's findings are
conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence.'97
The general tendency is to foreclose judicial review for private individuals be-
cause they lack standing. The FDCA makes no reference to a private cause of action
for private individuals-that is, potential consumers-who would be affected by the
FDA's approval or disapproval of the drug. 9 Therefore, consumers must satisfy
standing requirements to challenge the FDA.
For example, in Duncan v. United States, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma held that private individuals who sued the HHS
Secretary for prohibiting the use of a drug that would ostensibly treat their daughter's
'9' Id. at 1181.
192 See supra text accompanying note 161.
191 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2000).
194 id.
195 Id.
'96 Id. The exact text of the statute reads as follows: "No objection to the order of the
Secretary shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall have been urged before
the Secretary or unless there were reasonable grounds for failure to do so." Id.
197 Id.
198 See id.
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Down Syndrome did so without standing.' The court said that the FDCA allowed
anyone, even private individuals, to file an NDA with the FDA for the approval of a
new drug.20 The court said that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative
remedies because the plaintiffs had not shown a good faith attempt to comply with the
administrative procedures. 21' The court said that the plaintiffs could have submitted
an NDA, which they had not done, and then, if the FDA rejected their NDA, they could
have filed an appeal against the FDA if the FDA rejected their NDA.02 The fact
that an average individual is exceedingly unlikely to be in a position-financial or
otherwise- to either conceive of the product or to submit an NDA with the FDA was
not lost on the Duncan court, but the court felt constrained in its ability to alter what
it considered to be a constitutionally valid procedure. 20 3
Thus, as Duncan suggests, standing via administrative exhaustion is the critical
issue in any suit against the FDA.2 4 Administrative exhaustion is not an inflexible
command, however, and it may be circumvented in certain situations. Though section
355(h) of the FDCA requires exhaustion,205 courts recognize multiple exceptions to
the exhaustion doctrine. In his concurring opinion in Woodford v. Ngo, Justice Breyer
noted that constitutional claims, futility, hardship, and inadequate or unavailable rem-
edies are exceptions to exhaustion.206 The McCarthy v. Madigan court also recog-
nized three broad categories of exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine, namely when
(1) exhaustion would result in undue prejudice to subsequent court action, including
when there is an unreasonable or indefinite timetable for agency action; (2) the agency
does not have the power to grant the relief requested; and, (3) the agency is biased or
has predetermined the issue.207
199 590 F. Supp. 39, 42 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
200 Id. at 41-42 (citing the FDCA).
201 Id. at 43. The court specifically stated that "'[t]he fact that compliance might be expen-
sive and burdensome is not unfairness in the procedure."' Id. (quoting Rutherford v. Am. Med.
Assoc., 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1967)).
202 Id. at 42.
203 Id. at 44. The Duncan court revealed its position when it stated:
The court is concerned that the statutory scheme involved in gaining
approval for a new drug application may involve costs which are so
substantial as to cause plaintiff and persons similarly situated to forego
compliance with 21 U.S.C. § 355(b). However, that scheme is consti-
tutional as an exercise of Congress' power to set standards in order to
protect the public from unsafe drugs ....
Id. (quoting Gadler v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D. Minn. 1977)).
204 To be sure, administrative exhaustion has many virtues, including preserving admin-
istrative autonomy, see McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992), and aiding judicial
efficiency, example given, Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2385 (2006).
205 The text states that "[n]o objection to the order of the Secretary shall be considered by
the court unless such objection shall have been urged before the Secretary or unless there were
reasonable grounds for failure to do so." 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (2000).
206 Woodford, 126 S. Ct. at 2393 (Breyer, J., concurring).
207 McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146-48.42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) superseded McCarthy with respect
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Finally, consumers have standing and can bypass some of the requirements of
administrative exhaustion when the FDA delays acting on a citizen petition within
the requisite timeframe. The Code of Federal Regulations allows private individuals
to challenge the FDA through a citizen petition.2"8 Moreover, the FDA specifically
authorizes interested individuals to file a citizen petition or sNDA to request an OTC
switch for an approved prescription drug.2 9 When the citizen petition is filed, the FDA
Commissioner must respond to each petitioner within 180 days. 210 The FDA must
approve or deny the petition, or it must issue a tentative response.21" For example, the
FDA can state that the agency has not yet made a decision, explain the reasons why it
has not done so, and provide the probable response.212 In Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach (Abigail I), a non-profit agency
representing terminally ill patients filed a citizen petition challenging an FDA policy
that prohibited the sale of investigational new drugs deemed safe for expanded human
testing.213 The court did not question the petitioner's standing to challenge the FDA.214
The FDA had failed to respond to the citizen petition within the 180 days prescribed
by regulation, entitling the non-profit to seek judicial review of the challenged policy
because they had effectively exhausted administrative remedies.2 5 Consumers may
be able to apply any one of these exceptions to gain standing and bypass exhaustion in
a suit against FDA officials for failure to issue a decision on Plan B or any similar drug.
However, besides exhausting administrative remedies or meeting one of the recog-
nized exceptions to exhaustion, courts have found that consumers have constitutional
and prudential standing to challenge agency actions in federal court.216 Constitutional
standing under Article Ill has three elements.217 First, the plaintiff must show injury
or the threat of injury.2"' Second, the agency must have caused the injury or threat of
injury.29 Third, the court has to be able to remedy the injury.220 In addition to consti-
tutional standing, plaintiffs challenging FDA decisionmaking must meet the require-
ments for prudential standing. 22' A prospective plaintiff meets these requirements
to federal prisoners. Section 1997(e) expressly mandates that federal prisoners must exhaust
their administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (2000).
208 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(a) (2007).
209 Id. § 310.200(b).
210 Id. § 10.30(e)(2).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 445 F.3d 470,471-73, (D.C. Cir. 2006), rev'd en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding that terminally ill individuals have no fundamental right to access investigational drugs).
214 See id. at 473.
215 Id.
216 See Barnes v. Shalala, 865 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Wis. 1994).
217 Id. at 558.
218 id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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by showing that he or she is an individual to whom the relevant statute applies.222
In Barnes, the court found that consumers had both constitutional and prudential
standing to challenge the FDA's approval of bovine growth hormone because they
met the three aforementioned factors.223
C. A Constitutional Claim: The Fundamental Right of Privacy
According to Justice Breyer's concurrence in Woodford, consumers with a
constitutional claim could circumvent the exhaustion problem posed in Duncan.224
Potentially, consumers could base a constitutional claim on the fundamental right
of privacy, 225 but consumers may still find it hard to petition the court for review of
an FDA decision on the approval process based on this right.226
In Carnohan v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that a cancer patient had to
exhaust his administrative remedies by filing an NDA before the court would enter-
tain his constitutional claim.227 The plaintiff was a cancer patient who petitioned the
court for a declaratory judgment that laetrile was not a new drug so that he would not
have to go through the approval process. 228 The FDA Commissioner decided pre-
viously that laetrile was a new drug.2 29 The plaintiff argued that the administrative
process of filing a new drug application would create a substantial burden that would
infringe upon his constitutional rights.230 The court noted that "[c]onstitutional rights
of privacy and personal liberty do not give individuals the right to obtain laetrile free
of the lawful exercise of government police power., 231 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for declaratory judgment, noting
that individuals must exhaust their administrative remedies first.
23 2
The D.C. Circuit continued this reasoning recently in Abigail Alliance for Better
Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach (Abigail I1).233 The court affirmed
222 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000) states that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
223 Barnes, 865 F. Supp. at 560-61.
224 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
225 See supra Part I.A.
226 See, e.g., Duncan v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 39, 42 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (denying
petitioners standing under the exhaustion requirement without considering standing under
any constitutional rights).
227 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980).
228 Id. at 1121-22.
229 Id. at 1121.
230 Id. at 1122.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 No. 04-5350, 2007 WL 2238914, at *13 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 7, 2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). The appellants in Abigail II filed suit on behalf of terminally ill patients for the
right to access potentially life-saving drugs still in the investigational phase. Id. at *1.
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the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim, stating that access to investigational
new drugs is not a fundamental right under the Fifth Amendment.2 4 In making this
determination, the court concluded that access to new drugs was not rooted in the
nation's history and traditions.235 The right that would be asserted in any Plan B chal-
lenge would be fundamentally different than the rights asserted in both Carnohan and
Abigail II, however. Plan B plaintiffs would likely argue for access based on the funda-
mental right of privacy. Griswold v. Connecticut and its progeny firmly established
this fundamental right.236 Therefore, because of the robust history behind the constitu-
tional right of privacy concerning the decision whether to bear children, 23 7 it is likely
that a constitutional claim could be found in any case analogous to the Plan B decision.
Consumers challenging the FDA's decision to deny unrestricted OTC sales of
emergency contraceptives are as equally well-positioned as the dairy consumers in
Barnes to have standing to challenge FDA actions. Consumers of Plan B have con-
vincing evidence of injury or the threat of injury. First, consumers who could have
purchased Plan B over the counter during the time of the FDA's delay and used it to
prevent unwanted pregnancies would satisfy the injury or threat of injury requirement
for constitutional standing. Second, these consumers would be able to show that the
FDA's constructive denial of OTC Plan B caused the risk of physical or mental injury
brought on by an unplanned or unwanted pregnancy. Finally, though a court is not
able to order that the FDA approve a drug,238 a court can compel an agency official to
perform his or her duty.239 In other words, a court could order an FDA official to fol-
low the regulations that prescribe a timeline for decisionmaking and to definitively
rule on a drug application.
The FDA' s decision to approve Plan B for restricted OTC use-that is, behind-
the-counter use-is forward progress in Americans' rights to contraceptive freedom
and freedom from government intrusion in the bedroom. However, plaintiffs should
be able to base a private right of action against the FDA on the fundamental right of pri-
vacy because of the FDA's unreasonable delay in issuing a decision and the FDA's
decision to allow only behind-the-counter sales of Plan B, which requires the purchaser
to show proof of identity. As litigants, potential consumers would fight to extend the
234 Id. at *11.
235 Id. Despite its holding, the Abigail II court did not answer the "broader question of
whether access to medicine might ever implicate fundamental rights." Id. at *4 (emphasis
added).
236 See supra Part I.A.
237 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,720 (1997) (reviewing the cases up-
holding the right to bear children as a Due Process liberty interest and holding that physician-
assisted suicide is not a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (applying strict scrutiny to Oklahoma's sterilization laws and revers-
ing the Supreme Court of Oklahoma's order that the defendant undergo a vasectomy).
238 Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 37 (D. Minn. 1976).
239 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000).
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right of privacy in the bedroom into the public arena for the purposes of access to and
purchase of Plan B and similar drugs.
Thirty-two years ago, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,
championing a married couple's right to access contraceptives based on an enhanced
version of the fundamental right of privacy.240 Griswold relied on several different con-
stitutional amendments, including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.24" ' Therefore, potential consumers of OTC emergency contraceptives
should base their claims on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment242 in suits
against the FDA when the FDA improperly rules against the approval of a new drug
or against the prescription-to-OTC switch of an already approved drug, provided the
drug is safe and effective for use as evidenced by adequate clinical trials and studies.
D. Administrative Law Requirements
As a preliminary issue, not all drug products are covered by the umbrella of a
constitutional claim like Plan B is, but other methods to challenge the FDA, such as
exhaustion, could be used to bypass administrative law requirements.
As mentioned by Justice Breyer in Woodford, futility is an exception to the need
to exhaust administrative remedies.243 The McCarthy court also excused the failure
to exhaust on account of bias. 2" In fact, bias and futility work together to create an
alternative for an effective exhaustion of administrative remedies. The existence of
bias creates an exemption from the exhaustion of administrative remedies, for it would
be futile for an individual to petition a biased entity. Two cases are instructive here,
although they deal with state administrative proceedings.245 In Gibson v. Berryhill,
the Court affirmed that a state administrative agency was biased when it acted as a
judge and prosecutor in the revocation proceedings for multiple optometrist licenses.2 46
Similarly, in Kelly v. Board of Education, the court declined to require the plaintiffs
240 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). For a brief summary of Griswold and its place in the
evolution of contraceptive rights in America, see supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
241 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
242 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall.., be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
243 Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2393 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
244 McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1992).
245 Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Kelly v. Bd. of Educ., 159 F. Supp. 272
(M.D. Tenn. 1958).
246 The Gibson Court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the Alabama Board of
Optometry was biased because it previously filed a complaint in state court against the plain-
tiffs on charges substantially similar to the charges pending in the administrative proceeding.
411 U.S. at 578. First, the Court concluded that the administrative agency prejudged the
issue. Id. Second, the Court found that the administrative agency had a personal interest in
the outcome of the proceeding because the members of the Alabama Board of Optometry
were optometrists working in private practice who could benefit from revoking the licenses
of all optometrists working for business corporations in Alabama. Id.
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to exhaust administrative remedies because the administrative remedy, failing a petition
with a biased school board for admission or transfer, would be futile.247
Despite the fact that these cases are concerned specifically with state actions, they
demonstrate that Plan B plaintiffs could be exempt from the need to exhaust adminis-
trative remedies because the FDA effectively foreclosed non-scientific decisionmaking.
The same could apply to any plaintiffs in an analogous situation. Ergo, the Plan B
plaintiffs or their corollaries in an analogous lawsuit would be better served by filing
suit in district court for injunctive relief. When impartial decisionmaking is stone-
walled, attempting to exhaust administrative procedures is an inefficient use of
resources and ultimately futile.
Plaintiffs do not need to exhaust their administrative remedies if there is unrea-
sonable delay.2 48 The Supreme Court noted that unreasonable delay can constitute a
violation of due process.249 In Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., Illinois Bell filed
suit against the Illinois Commerce Commission and the Illinois Attorney General, seek-
ing an injunction against the enforcement of the current rate schedule after Illinois Bell
submitted a higher rate schedule. 250 When the district court granted the injunction, the
Illinois Commerce Commission and the Illinois Attorney General appealed,2 1 claiming
that Illinois Bell did not exhaust its legislative remedies.25 2 The Supreme Court found
that the Illinois Commerce Commission delayed issuing a decision on the proposed
rate increases for two years.25 3 Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed Illinois Bell
247 159 F. Supp. at 276. In Kelly, African American children and their parents filed a class
action against the Nashville Board of Education, asserting the children's constitutional right
to attend public schools. Id. at 273. The Nashville Board of Education's desegregation plan
allowed for a gradual integration beginning with first-grade students only. Id. at 274. The plan
also allowed parents to transfer students and called for further studies to determine the next
steps for integration. Id. The court stated that the proposed administrative remedies were in-
adequate and refused to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss for the plaintiffs failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 276. However, though the court found the defendant's
plan unconstitutional, it gave the defendant time to devise a new desegregation plan. Id. at
278-79.
248 E.g., Gibson, 411 U.S. at 574-75 (recognizing that unreasonable delay, bias, and the
inability to grant effective relief are three exceptions to exhaustion, and affirming that the plain-
tiffs did not have to wait until the Alabama Board of Optometry exhausted its administrative
remedies before filing suit in federal court for an injunction against the revocation of their
optometrist licenses); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590-92 (1926) (finding that
unreasonable delay can constitute a violation of due process).
249 Smith, 270 U.S. at 590-92.
250 Id. at 588.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 590.
253 Id. at 589. The Supreme Court remarked upon the Illinois Commerce Commission's
delay in approving or rejecting the proposed rate increase:
It thus appears that.., the commission, for a period of two years,
remained practically dormant; and nothing in the circumstances sug-
gests that it had any intention of going further with the matter. For this
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to seek judicial review for an injunction that would allow it to use the proposed rate
schedule despite the Illinois Commerce Commission Company's failure to act.254
Each of the examples listed above provides consumers with another method of
circumventing the standing and exhaustion requirements in Duncan, should the FDA
stonewall a controversial drug-including Plan B, but not limited to Plan B or even
to emergency contraceptives generally.
E. Objections to Administrative and Constitutionally-Based Private
Rights of Action
Some of the cases mentioned in the preceding section, especially Duncan, illustrate
situations in which the courts denied an individual's right to a private cause of action
against the FDA.2 -S One of the main objections by the Duncan court was the individual
plaintiff's lack of standing to challenge the FDA.256 However, as suggested earlier in
this Note, individual plaintiffs should be able to circumvent the standing requirement
to challenge the FDA approval process in one of several ways." 7 First, private individ-
uals join with others to finance and submit an NDA with the FDA. 8 Second, private
individuals could join a citizen petition to request a switch for an approved prescription
drug product, and the FDA would be obliged to respond.259 Lastly, private individuals
could get around the exhaustion requirement by seeking an exception to exhaustion,
including the constitutional claim exception, the futility and bias exceptions, and the
unreasonable delay exception.26°
Opponents of a broad standard of judicial review will argue against allowing
private individuals standing and exemptions from exhaustion under any of the fore-
going scenarios. First, opponents of a private right of action will argue that allowing
judicial review of agency actions in those scenarios would be too broad.261 What
apparent neglect on the part of the commission, no reason or excuse has
been given .... Property may be as effectively taken by long-continued
and unreasonable delay.., as by an express affirmance ... and where,
in that respect, such a state of facts is disclosed as we have here, the
injured public service company is not required indefinitely to await a
decision of the rate-making tribunal before applying to a federal court
for equitable relief.
Id. at 591-92.
254 Id.
255 See supra Part III.B.
256 Duncan v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 39, 42 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
258 See supra text accompanying note 203.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 211-14.
26 See supra Part III.B.
261 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile CaseforJudicial Review ofRulemaking,
85 VA. L. REv. 1243, 1244-45 (1999) (arguing that judicial review of administrative decisions
is an illegitimate power grab by the courts).
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this objection fails to consider, however, is that judicial review would be tailored and
limited to situations in which both the safety and effectiveness of the drug and the
consumer's good faith effort to comply with the administrative procedure or valid
exemption are shown. Opponents cannot argue that all drugs meet these two thresh-
old requirements. First, showing a product's safety and effectiveness is a high bar to
meet because reliable studies, clinical trials, and data must support these conclusions.
Second, it is complicated for consumers to show a good faith effort to comply with
administrative procedure because it implies that the consumers have the foresight to
submit an NDA, join a citizen petition, or document a valid exemption. Therefore, the
existence of these two thresholds limits litigation to the type of drug this individual
right of action is designed to protect-namely, to drugs like Plan B that are proven
to be safe and effective but that are also highly controversial.
A second objection opponents might raise is that a private right of action un-
necessarily challenges agency authority. However, this could be refuted by requiring
the consumer to demonstrate evidence of the agency's bad faith. Consumers should
be able to create an implication of the agency's bad faith by presenting evidence of the
product's safety and effectiveness.262 Departures from an agency's standard operating
procedures in the approval process could provide evidence of the agency's bad faith
as well.263 In either case, the challenge to agency authority would be appropriate, and
it would allow reviewing courts to check the power of administrative agencies that
exceed their statutory authority.
Opponents might object to allowing private causes of action because of the delays
it would cause in the agency's decisionmaking process. However, this objection would
not always be applicable. In the case of Plan B, the agency itself created the delay;
the lawsuit did not.264 Rather, filing a lawsuit is an appropriate means of compelling
an agency decision, so the courts would be providing a remedy for existing delay. 65
Opponents might counter that any delay on the agency's part is justifiable because of
the number of applicants or the need to thoroughly review the complex clinical trials
and studies. If that is the case, there will be no conflict; a court will conclude that
such a delay would not be unreasonable, and it would dismiss the consumer's lawsuit.
Lastly, opponents might object to a private right of action because it would require
courts to serve as scientific arbiters.266 In general, judges are not scientific and technical
experts, but agencies like the FDA hire expert staff to specifically evaluate drugs and
recommend decisions. Opponents would argue that courts should defer to the agency
262 See, e.g., J. Roland Pennock, Judicial Control ofAdministrative Decisions, 221 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 183, 188 (1942) (building on the theory of fair procedure).
263 See id.
264 See supra Part lI.B.
265 See generally Steven Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L.
REV. 1423 (1968) (promoting judicial review as a remedy for administrative delays that is
removed from the influence of wealth and political power).
266 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Judicial Review of Scientific Rulemaking, 9 Sci. TECH.
& HUM. VALUES 97, 97-98 (1984).
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and its specific expertise for this reason alone. Although it is true that most judges do
not have particularized scientific expertise, they are experts at making legal and factual
conclusions based on the evidence presented. And in most cases, judges would not
evaluate the effectiveness of a product by examining the drug's composition and its
supporting trials and studies. Instead, as in the case of Plan B, the court would deter-
mine whether the agency's conduct was appropriate by looking at the procedural
process.267 If the deviations from standard operating procedure are significant, the
courts may remand an agency's decision. Likewise, if individual constitutional rights
are unduly trampled, the courts may remand an agency's decision. Courts are well-
equipped to make these types of decisions.
F. Looking Forward: The Tummino Case
Tummino v. Von Eschenbach268 is a recent example of the struggle for the right
to challenge administrative agency action in court. Tummino began when individual
women and reproductive rights organizations filed a lawsuit asking for judicial review
of the FDA' s actions concerning Plan B OTC switch applications against the Acting
Commissioner of the FDA.269 Originally, the plaintiffs wanted several forms of relief:
(1) an injunction requiring the FDA to approve OTC access to
Plan B, (2) a judgment declaring that the FDA's denial of OTC
access to persons of all ages violates the APA and the United States
Constitution, and (3) if the court finds the FDA has not taken final
action, ajudgment declaring that the FDA has unlawfully withheld
or unreasonably delayed issuing such a final decision, in violation
of the APA and the United States Constitution, and an order requir-
ing the FDA to issue a final decision on OTC access to Plan B.27°
In response, the FDA submitted a motion for a protective order and a motion for
judgment on the pleadings. 27' The judge denied the FDA's motion for judgment on
the pleadings with respect to the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay claim and reserved
decision as to the remainder of the plaintiffs' claims.27 2 The court did not decide
whether OTC access for Plan B was appropriate.273 At the time of this Note's publi-
cation, the court had responded to the FDA's motion for a protective order against the
plaintiffs' discovery requests and planned depositions of present and former FDA
267 See, e.g., Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies: Does the
Type ofAgency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 265, 265 (1987).
268 427 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (order denying defendant's motion for a protective
order and granting discovery).
269 Id. at 215.
270 Id. at 216.
271 Id.
272 id.
273 Id. at 232.
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officials27 4 by denying the FDA's motion for a protective order.275 It found that the
plaintiffs were entitled to discovery that was broader than the administrative record
compiled by the FDA and that due to the nature of the claim-the fact that the FDA
was accused of unreasonable delay in rendering a decision on the Plan B OTC switch
application-the court needed to look at evidence outside the record to determine
whether the delay was reasonable.276 The plaintiffs' suggestion that the FDA acted
in bad faith with respect to the Plan B applications elicited the court's order.277
The plaintiffs based their original claims on two sources: the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and the Constitution.278
1. Tummino's Unreasonable Delay Claim
279
The APA provides guidelines for judicial review of administrative agencies.28 0
Under the APA, a reviewing court has the authority to "compel agency action
274 Id. at 216.
275 Id. at 235.
276 Id. at 230-31.
277 id.
278 Id. at 215.
279 The Tummino plaintiffs amended their complaint after the February 2006 discovery
order. Compare 3d Amended Complaint at 1 1, Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp.
2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-05-0366) with 5th Amended Complaint at 1 1, Tummino v.
Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. CV-05-0366). In its most recent
form from October 2006, the complaint reiterates the Tummino plaintiffs' standing to challenge
the FDA based on the FDA regulation that authorizes interested individuals to file citizen
petitions to request OTC switches for prescription drugs. 5th Amended Complaint at 35,
Tummino, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212 (No. CV-05-0366) (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.200(b) &
10.30(e)(2)). The Tummino plaintiffs continue to argue that the FDA violated the APA and
the Constitution by denying OTC access to Plan B for all ages and by approving Plan B behind-
the-counter sales. Id. at 1 1. They assert that the FDA violated the constitutional rights of pri-
vacy and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at In 167, 169. Furthermore, they
also state that the FDA's actions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and that the
FDA exceeded its statutory authority. Id. at V 153, 165. The Tummino plaintiffs adjusted their
prayer for relief, however, to reflect the removal of the unreasonable delay cause of action.
Instead, the Tummino plaintiffs request injunctive relief in the form of Plan B OTC approval
for women of all ages, a declaratory judgment that the FDA's denial of OTC access to Plan B
violated the APA and the Constitution, and other equitable relief. Id. at 1. The Tummino
plaintiffs do cite the FDA's unreasonable delay as evidence of bad faith and improper agency
action. Id. at 148-57, 160.
280 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). Under the APA, unreasonable delay is one foundation for a cause
of action against a government organization or its employees. See id. § 706(1). Other possible
foundations under the APA include arbitrary or capricious findings, id. § 706(2)(A), decisions
that violate constitutional rights or privileges, id. § 706(2)(B), decisions outside the scope of
the agency's authority, id. § 706(2)(C), decisions made without regard to statutorily-prescribed
procedure, id. § 706(2)(D), decisions unsupported by substantial evidence, id. § 706(2)(E), and
factually unwarranted findings, id. § 706(2)(F). Given Tummino, potential plaintiffs who are
part of a citizen petition may also have standing. See supra Parts III.B, III.E (discussing the use
of a citizen petition as evidence of plaintiffs' good faith efforts).
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unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. '2 8' The court echoed the plaintiffs'
suggestion of unreasonable delay when it remarked:
On January 21,2005, the FDA announced that a decision on Barr's
amended application would be delayed beyond the 180-day period
in which it is ordinarily required to act on such an application.
Nevertheless, in the ensuing months up through August of 2005,
the FDA apparently did nothing to advance the decision-making
process, adding but two documents to the administrative record
during that entire period.282
After noting that the plaintiffs' evidence supported the claim of unreasonable delay,
the court reprimanded the FDA for stalling in order to prevent review of its decision. 283
Specifically, the court said that "the actions of the FDA in dealing with the SNDA
and the amended SNDA, strongly suggest that the delay is a calculated 'filibuster'
designed to avoid making a decision subject to judicial review. ' 28
Unreasonable delay can be an exception to the exhaustion of administrative
remedies.285 A situation in which the preliminary evidence points toward approval
and where the FDA continually withholds a decision based on non-scientific reasoning
could be sufficient for a finding of unreasonable delay.
The Tummino plaintiffs originally sought an injunction to compel the FDA to issue
a decision on the Plan B application.286 As a practical matter, the plaintiffs' request
for the court to order the FDA to issue a definitive decision on the Plan B appli-
cation became null when the FDA issued a decision in August 2006 to allow behind-
the-counter sales of Plan B without a prescription to women and men aged eighteen
and over. 287 Now even if the court does find that the FDA unreasonably delayed the
decision, it is unable to order specific performance because the requested performance
has been performed. This is a less than satisfactory result for two reasons. First, for
those who would have preferred an all-or-nothing result, the FDA's abrupt decision
in 2006 created an awkward compromise: behind-the-counter sales, not OTC sales,
281 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
282 Tummino, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (citations omitted).
283 Id. at 232.
284 Id.
28 See supra Part III.D.
286 Tummino, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 216.
287 The plaintiffs' requested remedies included an injunction requiring the FDA to approve
Plan B for OTC availability, and, if the court found unreasonable delay, an order requiring the
FDA to issue a final decision on OTC availability of Plan B. See id. Although the plaintiffs could
still receive ajudgment stating that the FDA's actions violated the APA and the Constitution,
it would be essentially a symbolic victory, because the practical effect of the judgment-the
injunction-would already have been satisfied by the August 2006 decision. Id.
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for a certain group of women, but not for all women. Second, on a more general level,
the FDA's decision was anticlimactic in that it underscored the reality that the FDA,
when challenged, can short-circuit accountability by limiting a drug's proposed scope
of access. Assuming the FDA had not already issued a decision on Plan B, however,
the text of the court's opinion suggests that, given the evidence presented in favor
of the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay claim and provided that discovery would later
yield no evidence to the contrary, the court would be inclined to require the FDA to
issue a final decision on the Plan B OTC switch applications.288
2. Tummino' s Constitutional Claim
The Tummino plaintiffs presented two constitutional claims in their lawsuit
against the FDA.289 The plaintiffs established a link between their claims and the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits an individual's deprivation of
liberty without due process of law. 290 The plaintiffs claimed that the FDA's delay over
Plan B OTC availability infringed on women's right of privacy because the right
to contraceptives falls within the scope of privacy rights.29' As mentioned earlier,
Eisenstadt established the idea that an individual's right to contraceptives is based on
the fundamental right of privacy.29 Similarly, the APA also permits a cause of action
for private individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated.293 The Tummino
plaintiffs have a stronger basis from which to argue for a constitutional claim than
the plaintiffs in Carnohan, Abigail II, or Duncan.294
3. Tummino Summary
Tummino contains significant factual differences from Duncan. The Duncan court
quickly dispatched with the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.295 The Duncan plaintiffs
were persons with Down Syndrome and their parents or guardians.296 The court stated
that this was not a protected class and that there was no discriminatory treatment.29 In
Tummino, however, the plaintiffs are women or women's organizations advocating
288 The court found a strong preliminary showing of bad faith. See id. at 232-33.
289 Id. at 215-16.
290 Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
291 Tummino, 427 F. Supp. 2d at 215-16.
292 See supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
293 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2000). The text of the act states that a reviewing court must "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be... contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity." Id.
294 See supra Part III.C.
295 Duncan v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 39, 41 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
296 id.
297 id.
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the approval of a drug designed for use by women only.298 As such, the Tummino
plaintiffs have a stronger argument that the FDA discriminated based on sex, which
is a recognized protected class.29 As it stands, however, the plaintiffs in Tummino are
unlikely to succeed even if they base their claim on equal protection. Remedies for the
plaintiffs' suit include equitable relief, such as an order to compel the FDA to make
a decision.3°° The equal protection argument based on the plaintiffs' status as women
became less compelling when the FDA approved Plan B in August 2006, because now
some women do have access to Plan B. The Tummino plaintiffs continue to challenge
the FDA for discrimination based on the FDA's denial of unrestricted OTC access.0
The government may still be challenged for discriminating against the young, but in
general the State has a stronger interest in protecting and regulating minors.30 2
The Tummino court did not decide the issue of OTC access to Plan B, and thus it
did not confirm the plaintiffs' right to challenge the FDA approval process based on the
right of privacy or equal protection. However, the court did validate the plaintiffs'
right to challenge the FDA based on a theory of the FDA's unreasonable delay.303 The
Tummino plaintiffs dropped this cause of action in their fifth amended complaint. 3'4
Had the FDA continued to delay making a decision on Plan B OTC access, the court
may have entered judgment for the plaintiffs on this claim, thereby encouraging a cause
of action based on the constitutional right of privacy.
Tummino creates an opening for consumers to challenge the FDA approval
process. First, the potential plaintiffs must have standing and evidence of exhaustion
or an exception to exhaustion.3 5 In general, the applicant is allowed to challenge the
FDA because he or she is the only one to go through the administrative remedies of
filing an NDA and appealing the decision.3° A special exception to standing applies
to prescription-to-OTC switch applications by virtue of section 310.200 of the Code
of Federal Regulations. 37 This statute allows private individuals, including consumers,
298 Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
299 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-32 (1996); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
77 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute that favored males over females in the administration
of estates was unconstitutional).
'00 There is a difference between a court that orders the FDA to make a decision and a court
that tells the FDA how to decide. Because Congress delegated power to the FDA to determine
the safety and efficacy of drugs, the district courts have no role in determining whether the FDA
should approve a particular drug. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 37 (D. Minn. 1976).
301 5th Amended Complaint, supra note 282, ato l 158-59, 170.
302 E.g., Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 126 S. Ct. 961, 966 (2006).
303 Judge Korman denied the FDA's motion for a judgment on the pleadings insofar as it
attacked the plaintiffs' unreasonable delay claim. Judge Korman also expressly authorized
discovery with respect to the unreasonable delay claim. Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427
F. Supp. 2d 212, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
31 See 5th Amended Complaint, supra note 282, at 1 1.
305 See supra Part III.B.
'06 See id.
307 21 C.F.R. § 310.200(b) (2007).
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to petition the FDA. 0 These petitioners have standing to challenge FDA action or
inaction based on the citizen petition.3' 9 Furthermore, applicants are allowed to by-
pass exhaustion before seeking administrative review in certain situations, and non-
applicants should be able to use some of these exceptions, too.31° Unreasonable delay,
constitutional claims, hardship, futility, and bias are five exceptions to exhaustion.'
Second, Tummino suggests that consumers who want to challenge an FDA
decision or lack thereof should base their claims directly on constitutional rights if
the FDA's denial or unreasonable delay would deprive them of those rights.3 12 In that
situation, a plaintiff would have recourse to the courts to satisfy the due process require-
ment. Potential plaintiffs' best chances of maintaining a private cause of action against
the FDA increase when access to the drug falls under the scope of some recognized
right or privilege.313 For example, a potential plaintiff would have a better chance chal-
lenging the FDA approval process for a reproductive drug or contraceptive, such as
a drug that safely and effectively prevents or even terminates pregnancy, than a drug
that safely and effectively hastens death in terminally ill patients, simply because there
is no constitutionally recognized right to die or take one's own life.314 In fact, it is
theoretically possible that manufacturers or even potential consumers of RU-486
could use the Plan B OTC switch application process in support of increased access
to RU-486 in the United States.
Finally, a consumer has a better chance of success when the facts are similar to the
facts in the Plan B OTC switch application approval process. The Tummino plaintiffs
have compelling facts, including sound scientific studies showing the safety and
efficacy of the drug that are endorsed by a majority of the FDA's review staff and
joint advisory committee; repeated delay or denial of the application by the FDA; and,
convincing evidence of bad faith on the part of FDA officials making the decision. 315
"Bad faith" can take several forms, as it did in the Plan B case, including political,
moral, or religious reasoning used to deny the application and pressure or influence
by high-level management or outside politicians for a specific outcome; 316 statements
by FDA decisionmakers intimating that a decision for the approval of the drug was
made before the completion of the review; 317 resignations of FDA personnel in protest
308 id.
309 Id. at § 10.30(e)(2) (explaining the deadline for an agency response and the form required
of the response).
310 See supra Parts III.B-D.
311 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
312 Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
s3 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
314 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997) (explaining that the right to
assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental right).
315 See GAO, supra note 116 (examining the FDA's decision process in evaluating Plan B
and concluding it was unusual).
316 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 90, at A4.
311 See GAO, supra note 116, at 21.
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over the final decision;.. and an abrupt reversal of the FDA's decision from rejection
to approval." 9
CONCLUSION
This Note began by exploring the progress toward increased access to ordinary
and emergency contraceptives in the United States.3 20 Over the years, challenges based
on a constitutional right of privacy allowed individuals to assert their right to con-
traceptives in a gradual fashion. Securing the right to behind-the-counter access of
emergency contraceptives in August 2006 was not easy. Discrepancies emerged early
in the FDA approval process for Plan B prescription-to-OTC switch applications. 321
Evidence suggests that the FDA chose not to approve a safe and effective product
for OTC use by American women, a move which surpassed its statutory delegation
of authority.3
22
This Note posited that the American public has a right to challenge the FDA's
drug approval process. It also suggested that the FDA improperly violated its duty and
obligation to the American public by unreasonably delaying its decision to approve
Plan B for OTC use and by allowing moral judgments to influence its decisionmaking
process. Building on the example of Tummino v. Von Eschenbach, this Note out-
lined a way in which consumers could challenge analogous infringements on their
fundamental rights in limited circumstances.323
In conclusion, the FDA's recent delay and denial of unrestricted OTC access for
Plan B threatens the fundamental right of privacy. The evidence suggests that the
FDA based its decisions on the moral judgments and religious convictions held by
high-level officials and the high-powered politicians who influenced them. However,
Tummino v. Von Eschenbach illustrates that the public has the right to challenge the
FDA approval process. Consumers should be willing to exercise this right. Not only
may challenging the FDA lead to relief on an individual and national scale, it may also,
somewhat ironically, restore the integrity of the FDA and public faith in that agency
at the same time.
318 See, e.g., Marc Kaufman, FDA Official Quits over Delay on Plan B, WASH. POST,
Sept. 1, 2005, at A8.
319 See Stein, supra note 90, at A4.
320 See supra Part I.
321 See supra Part II.B.
322 See id.
323 See supra Part III.F.
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